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Abstract
This paper studies the impact of foreign labour on the competitiveness of Italian dairy
farms relying on the theory of foreign labour in profit functions. Application of an
endogenous switching regression model identifies the drivers of adoption of the immi-
grant workforce. A counterfactual analysis performed on unit labour costs between
farms employing and non-employing immigrants suggests the essential role of for-
eign farmworkers on dairy farms’ competitiveness, which provide a cheaper source
of labour. The lower unit labour cost for immigrant workers resembles staunch sup-
port to the newly introduced ‘social conditionality’, for a CAP delivering also for
farmworkers.
Keywords: CAP conditionality, farm competitiveness, immigrant workers, endoge-
nous switching regression, labour costs
JEL classification: J43, J61, C34
1. Introduction
The ‘globalization of the countryside’ shaped the last decades of the agricul-
tural sector, increasing the competition and upstream and downstream pressure
on European Union (EU) farms (Corrado, 2015). Among agricultural inputs,
labour is a flexible production factor that farm businesses can adjust internally
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in order to widen margins and improve profitability. However, factors such
as the seasonality of the farming operations and, consequently, of the labour
markets, the low agricultural wages and the hard labour conditions reduce
the incentives for domestic workers to engage in agriculture, downsizing the
overall offer of domestic EU agricultural labour (Devadoss and Luckstead,
2008; Corrado, 2015). Agri-food systems in high-income countries make up
only 10 per cent of the workforce, with the majority of jobs in food process-
ing and services. Urbanised countries rely upon longer food supply chains
with marginal roles for agricultural employers, with older, more wage- and
immigrant-oriented farms’ workforce (Christiaensen, Rutledge and Taylor,
2020). As a result, foreign workers become a necessary source of labour to
supply the domestic shortages in many EU Member States (MS), providing
flexible and adaptable labour, often at a lower cost (Baldoni, Coderoni and
Esposti, 2017; Malchow-Møller et al., 2013; Barham, Melo and Hertz, 2020;
Peri and Rutledge, 2020). In the case of Italy, the labour market hosted 11 per
cent of foreign workers in 2018, while for the EU-28, the share shrinks to
8 per cent (data from EUROSTAT). According to ISTAT (Italy National Statis-
tical Institute), more than 5million foreigners were registered in Italy in 2018,
which corresponds to about 9 per cent of the total population. About 50 per cent
of Italian immigrants are from Europe (30 per cent from the EU-28), 25 per
cent from Africa, 20 per cent from Asia and 7 per cent from America. Con-
cerning the Italian agricultural sector, the latest official report points to more
than one-third – around 350,000 workers – of farmworkers being foreigners
(CREA, 2019). The United Nations Special Rapporteur1, in January 2020,
estimates approximately half a million migrants employed in the farming sec-
tor, representing nearly half of the total workforce, of which 40 per cent is
estimated to be irregular.
Despite the important economic, social and political implications of foreign
workers entering the EU agricultural labour markets, the literature study-
ing their effects on farm’s competitiveness is still under development and
not clear cut. Indeed, employing foreigners may influence the farm perfor-
mance through several complex ways. In their empirical application, Baldoni,
Coderoni and Esposti (2021) unveil how the cultural diversity of farmwork-
ers affects farm productivity through an inverted U-shaped curve – hence
carrying a positive effect up to a certain point, after which the effect turns
negative. Overall, this suggests that the net impact depends on a number of fac-
tors, including economic, technical and managerial ones. Indeed, our results
describe the impact on the competitiveness via lower labour costs, confirm-
ing the variety of channels through which immigrant workforce can affect
farms’ performance. Therefore, micro-level analyses for a thorough under-
standing are needed (Baldoni, Coderoni and Esposti, 2021), while empirical
studies so far widely rely on aggregate data (Devadoss and Luckstead, 2008;
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Partridge, Rickman and Ali, 2008). Malchow-Møller et al. (2013) investi-
gate the role of immigrants on Danish farms’ performance, finding that farms
employing immigrants are generally larger (in terms of the number of employ-
ees, value added and revenues) and not less productive than those who do not
hire foreigners. Explanations rely on the fact that migrants may either consti-
tute a cheaper source of labour or bring in specific skills fostering productivity.
Baldoni, Coderoni and Esposti (2017) study the role of the immigrant labour
force in the Italian agricultural sector, finding that immigrants tend to be con-
centrated in larger farms with higher productivity levels. However, the authors
stress that when a positive correlation exists between foreign labourers and
productivity levels, this may stem from model misspecifications as the posi-
tive relationship disappears when the dynamic nature of labour productivity is
accounted for.
Baldoni, Coderoni and Esposti (2021) focus on the link between immigrant
workforce and productivity mimicking constant-wage conditions by control-
ling for wage differentials. Nevertheless, both anecdotal (Augère-Granier,
2021) and scientific evidence (Malchow-Møller, Munch and Skaksen, 2012;
Malchow-Møller et al., 2013) recognise that the immigrant workforce rep-
resents an opportunity to reduce farms’ labour costs, thus enhancing farms’
competitiveness (OECD, 2019). Nevertheless, much of the research efforts
applied to the US context: Barham, Melo and Hertz (2020) offer recent evi-
dence of lower wages for agricultural immigrant workers in the United States
than nationals. Peri and Rutledge (2020) study the wage gaps between immi-
grant and national workers, finding that agriculture displays the highest wage
differential of up to 55 per cent with a slow rate of convergence among dif-
ferent economic sectors. Martin and Taylor (2003) show a circular relation
between farm employment and immigration, which, in turn, during the 90s,
fuelled the poverty rate in rural America, suggesting that low-skilled farm jobs
are taken up by migrants, who transfer poverty from their country of origin to
the United States.
Overall, there is a paucity of empirical works investigating the role of the
immigrant workforce within the EU agricultural sector, especially from the
microeconomics perspective. The existing literature mainly focuses on the
relationship between immigrants and the farm’s productivity, with no con-
tribution assessing whether differentials exist between national and foreign
workers’ labour cost, the latter being a significant leverage for farms’ com-
petitiveness. Therefore, the present case study contributes to fill these gaps,
providing fresh insights on the linkages between immigrant farmworkers and
farm competitiveness in Italy, one of the most emblematic EU agricultural sec-
tors. From a microeconomic perspective, the present study concludes that the
immigrant workforce is a resource for enhancing farm competitiveness, light-
ening the economic burden of labour costs. Moreover, we give first inputs
on which farms’ and farmers’ characteristics, including different Common






/erae/advance-article/doi/10.1093/erae/jbab045/6395009 by guest on 26 O
ctober 2021
4 F. Antonioli et al.
force. The recent open letter2 signed by many influential people and organisa-
tions in both agricultural and labour sectors utterly heated up the socio-political
debate on working conditions in the EU agricultural sector. The signatories
explicitly call for the inclusion of a social conditionality in the upcoming
CAP: beyond the ethical considerations, it will ensure protection to those
farmers respecting workers’ rights but suffering from unfair competition from
those farmers that do not. Eventually, the agreement on the CAP 2023–2027,
reached in June 2021, includes the social conditionality as a requisite for
receiving public EU subsidies (European Parliament, 2021). Therefore, vio-
lating labour rights (e.g. poor wages) is an explicit strategy for increasing the
farm’s competitiveness, and the COVID-19 pandemic exposed the pivotal role
of immigrants for much of the EU agricultural sectors (European Commission,
2020).
Our analysis is rooted in literature, from which the following scenarios can
be derived: (i) according to neoclassical growth models, immigration consti-
tutes a simple upwards shift of the labour supply, with no effects on competi-
tiveness per se (e.g. labour productivity grows because of the growth of total
factor productivity); (ii) foreign workers can entail negative impacts due to the
lack of integration, communication problems with co-workers and managers
(Baldoni, Coderoni and Esposti, 2021) and lack of experience and expertise in
agricultural duties (Peri, 2012); (iii) foreign workers may receive lower wages
than their national counterparts, generating cost-efficient, positive effects
on farm performance and hence competitiveness (Malchow-Møller et al.,
2013); (iv) employing immigrants may bear some fixed costs that only some
farms with specific characteristics are more likely to sustain (Malchow-Møller
et al., 2013).
The present study provides policy-relevant pieces of empirical evidences.
First, foreign labour force exerts a generally positive impact on farms’ labour
costs by reducing unit labour costs (ULC), entailing positive feedback for com-
petitiveness. Second, there are factors related to the farm, such as the farm size
and its location, the farmers’ characteristics, such as education, but also spe-
cific CAP measures that are correlated with the use of immigrant workers.
Results offer support to policymakers for the design of interventions aimed at
smoothing the inclusion of migrant workers in the farm sector, besides giving
insights on the role of CAP instruments, particularly useful for the recently
agreed social conditionality on which the upcoming EU agricultural policy
will hinge on.
The Endogenous Switching Regression (ESR) model resembles a powerful
tool to study the determinants of employing/non-employing foreign workers
and perform a counterfactual analysis while correcting for potential endogene-
ity bias. The empirical analysis focuses on the Italian dairy sector using a panel
dataset of 10,138 observations for dairy farms covering the period 2008–2018.
2 ‘The New Cap Needs Social Conditionality. End exploitation and raise labour standards in Euro-
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We focus on the Italian dairy sector as in last decades it showed a significant
substitution of national workers with foreigners and, due to its non-seasonal
nature and requiring a certain degree of specialisation, the farmworkers’
turnover is usually lower than other agricultural sectors. These characteristics
may better capture the influence of immigrant workers on farm performances
in spite of potential data limitations such as under-recording of working
hours.
The paper is structured as follows: the next section describes the current sit-
uation regarding the use of foreign labour in the Italian farming and dairy sec-
tor. Section 3 presents the theoretical background informing the econometric
strategy developed in Section 4. Section 5 reports the data used and describes
the econometric specification of the applied model. Section 6 discusses the
results, while the last section concludes, developing policy considerations and
implications.
2. Foreign labour in the Italian dairy sector
Currently, immigrant employees are an irreplaceable source of labour for many
agricultural sectors in Italy.3 This is due not only to the low attractiveness of
agricultural jobs for the national workers but also to structural dynamics typi-
cal of the Italian agricultural systems that constrain the availability of labour:
the large number of people exiting the sector; the ageing of farms owners and
the lack of successors (Coopmans et al., 2021); hence the decreasing amount
of unpaid and family labour (see Christiaensen, Rutledge and Taylor (2020) for
more details on the global trends). The Statistical Report on Immigration (Idos,
and Confronti, 2002) highlights that farming is the sector where newly arrived
migrant workers start their job search. The latest official report on foreign
workers in Italian agriculture (CREA, 2019) calculates that in 2017 more than
one-third of the total agricultural employees were foreigners.4,5 In terms of
internal distribution, the Italian Ministry of Labour and Social Policies reports
that in 2017 most of the migrant workers were located in the Italian North-
Eastern regions (27 per cent), followed by South (24 per cent), Centre (21 per
cent), North-West (18 per cent) and, finally, Islands (10 per cent) (Ministero
del Lavoro e delle Politiche Sociali, 2018).
The uncertain contractual conditions and the urgency of migrants to obtain
a source of income to sustain their families and their own living, lead to the
proliferation of illicit practices such as the caporalato, an informal system
of recruit-and-control of farmworkers, especially migrants, characterised by
3 On the total legal immigrants on the Italian territory, CREA (2019) details 9 per cent works in
agriculture, 17per cent in the manufactural sector, 10per cent in the building sector, 21per cent
in restaurants, hotels, and other commercial activities, while 46per cent in other services (e.g.
caring).
4 In the present study, the terms immigrant, foreign, and migrant are used to designate persons
who are not Italian. On the contrary, national is an Italian person.
5 See Table A2 in the Appendix for more details on how the immigrant workforce is distributed
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exploitation (Fanizza and Omizziolo, 2019; Salvia, 2020). This creates a net-
work of ‘under-the-table’ intermediaries who play a pivotal role in the current
equilibrium of the agricultural labour market in some Italian regions. More-
over, it creates problems of under- andmis-reporting – that is, declaring a lower
amount of timeworked to what was carried out or whenworkers perform activ-
ities that are different from what the signed contract refers to – representing
the most common example of illegal work practices (INEA, 2013).6 Corrado
(2015) reports that only 43 per cent of agricultural foreign work situations
are entirely legal, while 29 per cent are partially lawful (i.e. under-reporting)
and 28 per cent fully unlawful. Because of the lack of complete information
regarding immigrant labour, it is difficult to evaluate the actual impact on the
agricultural sector and its competitiveness. The informal contractual relation-
ships and the illegally low wages can significantly reduce the production costs
providing biased pictures of the cost-effectiveness.
The dairy sector requires specific skills and specialisation – cow husbandry,
milking, milk processing and cheese production – and hard work conditions
such as large amounts of early working hours. These factors make this job less
attractive for national workers, being substituted by the immigrant workforce
(Fondazione FAI, and CISL, 2017; Nori and Farinella, 2020b). Moreover, milk
production is not as seasonal as the fruit and vegetable sectors and requires a
stable workforce hired via permanent contracts and specialising on specific
phases of the production processes (Huffman and Evenson, 2001; Nori and
Farinella, 2020a). In value terms, the production of cow milk accounts for
9 per cent of the whole agricultural production (32 billion euro in 2018), while
the transformation phase around 12 per cent of the total food production. With
approximately 27,000 dairy farms, more than 50 per cent are small farms (i.e.
<30 heads), producing 4 per cent of total production only; while big dairy
units (i.e. >150 heads) represent less than one-fourth of total agricultural units,
although producing almost 80 per cent of the total raw milk. The weight of
labour on total costs range from 11 per cent to 19 per cent, depending on the
farm size and production (e.g. Protected Designation of Origins (PDOs) cheese
or raw fluid milk) (ISMEA, 2019).
Figure 1 describes the labour trends in the sample of Italian dairies used
in the present study, highlighting the increasing role of migrants in dairy
farm employees, together with the negative trend of domestic labour and the
stagnant-to-decreasing role of unpaid (family) worked hours.
The qualitative analysis of the dataset used in the present study also
reveals interesting patterns regarding wages between immigrant and national
farmworkers. Analysing farms that solely employ either nationals or immi-
grants permits to obtain crystal-clear data concerning their hourly retribution.
6 See also the statement of Hilal Elver, United Nations Special Rapporteur, on the right to
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Figure 2 illustrates how immigrant farmworkers generally receive lower per-
hour wages than nationals.7 Specifically, when we compare the hourly wage
by contract typologies (i.e. seasonal and non-seasonal), such differential is
sharper: foreigners employed as seasonal workers receive 1.10 Euro less per
hour worked than the national counterparts, while for non-seasonal working
contracts such difference rises to 1.85 Euro per working hour.
3. Theoretical background
The contribution of foreign labour to a dairy farm’s profit is described by the
general profit function developed by Malchow-Møller et al., (2013), defined
as a production function of national and immigrant labour inputs, LNi ,L
I
i ,

















The costs associated with national labour are assumed to be equal for all
dairy units8, while immigrant labour costs are farm specific, depending on
farms’ characteristics and experience. Therefore, each farm is characterised by
7 The statistic retrieved is the median value to avoid misleading outliers effects. The non-seasonal
category refers to farmworkers with either permanent or fixed-term contracts.
8 Despite this assumption as per Malchow-Møller et al., (2013), the cost of hiring national farm-
workers may also be farm specific (CNi ), for instance, because of local-specific supply conditions.
Please note that such assumptions do not change the theoretical background. Due to the specific
focus the present study devotes to immigrant workers and farm-specific factors shaping their
employment, we prefer to assume homogeneous cross-farms hiring costs.
Fig. 1. Average working hours per type of workforce: unpaid, national and immigrant. Italian dairy
sector, 2008–2018.
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Fig. 2. Median hourly retribution per type of contract (seasonal and non-seasonal) and farmworkers’
origin in the Italian dairy sector, 2008–2018.
Source: Authors’ elaboration on the Italian FADN.
farm-specific foreign workers’ wage and fixed costs (e.g. search and admin-
istrative costs and costs related to the integration of the farmworker), with
the latter characterised by increasing marginal costs whenever the local labour
supply is limited. By defining L∗i and L
I∗
i as the optimal amounts of national
and immigrant farm labour, and Li as the total amount of labour, there are three
potential scenarios:
(a) : πi = fi(Li)−C(Li),as CN(LNi ) = CIi(LIi); (2)










;LIi ∈ (0,L∗i ] (3)



















In scenario (a), national and immigrant labour inputs are perfect substitutes
with the same cost; therefore, the farmer is indifferent to hiring nationals or
immigrant workers and one may expect no effects on farm performances. In
this scenario, foreigners are just an increase in total agricultural labour offer.
In scenario (b), the cost of immigrant labour is lower than national cost;
therefore, the adoption of foreign labour minimizes the dairy farm’s total
labour cost, CIi (L
I∗
i )+C
N (L∗i − LIi). The lower cost of immigrant labour can
be due to lower wages or to the higher productivity of immigrants producing
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Finally, in scenario (c), the access (or cost) to immigrant labour is farm
specific because of factors such as farm location and the availability of immi-
grant workers in the local labour market (e.g. certain areas may attract more
immigrants because of the presence of ethnic enclaves), the farmer’s attitude
towards foreigners or a different marginal cost of employing migrants. In this
scenario, the adoption of foreign labour can affect the farms’ performance in
two ways: first, because there are additional strictly positive fixed costs (fc0)
of adopting foreign labour increasing the total production costs, activated only
when immigrant farmworkers are employed (fc0 ∗ I(LIi > 0)). Such fixed costs
can be, for example, costs of integration depending on the farm’s experience
in dealing with foreign workers. This can raise self-selection issues as only the
already competitive farms, or the largest ones relying on economies of scale,
can sustain the additional fixed costs. As assumed by Malchow-Møller et al.
(2013), the adoption of foreign workers can be a consequence of the insuf-
ficient offer of national workers, resulting in negative effects of immigrants
on the dairy farm’s competitiveness when more expensive or less skilled. In
addition, lower competitiveness can be due to the farm’s location: in marginal
and less developed rural areas with lower availability of domestic labour, less
competitive farms have incentives in adopting foreign workers. On the con-
trary, some dairy farms may have more access to skilled migrant workers,
improving the farm’s competitiveness.
In summary, based on the Malchow-Møller et al., (2013) theoretical work
described above, themain factors influencing the adoption of immigrant labour
are: (i) the farm and farmer characteristics and (ii) the impact of immigrant
labour on dairy farm’s total labour costs. These factors act simultaneously
and we formalize them in the following hypothesis, helping in structuring the
empirical strategy:
H1: Farms’ and farmers’ characteristics, including CAP measures, signifi-
cantly influence the likelihood of employing foreign workers;
H2: The adoption of foreign labour relates to lower total labour costs, improv-
ing dairy farms’ competitiveness.
4. Econometric strategy
The ESR allows to both identify the drivers of adoption of foreign labour and
to execute a counterfactual analysis on the impact of immigrant workers on the
farm’s ULC. Therefore, it is used to test both hypotheses H1 and H2.
Employing immigrants may be a strategic decision allowing to reduce
costs and thus increase the competitiveness, posing a self-selection prob-
lem and eliciting an endogeneity bias, as certain (unobserved) characteristics
potentially affect the farmers’ choice. The ESR allows for bias-corrected
estimates via the simultaneous estimation of the choice of hiring immigrant
workers and the farms’ ULC for employing and non-employing9 immigrants.
9 Note that the terms ‘employing’ and ‘treated’, as well as ‘non-employing’ and ‘untreated’, are
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The ESR generates selection-corrected (expected) ULC estimates for both
employing and non-employing, delivering unbiased treatment effects (i.e.
the choice of employing immigrants) for both treated and untreated farms
(Di Falco, Veronesi and Yesuf, 2011; Di Falco, 2014). The statistically sig-
nificant difference in ULC between farms employing and not employing
immigrants would resemble a test for the substitution effect, answering to the
question posed by scenario (a).
The choice of ESR is motivated by the following reasons: (i) simple regres-
sion models (i.e. OLS) would not allow controlling for unobserved farms’ and
farmers characteristics – both potentially correlated with the choice of hir-
ing immigrants and the ULC – leading to a biased treatment effect (Fuglie
and Bosch, 1995; Di Falco, Veronesi and Yesuf, 2011); (ii) matching tech-
niques (e.g. propensity score matching) allows to control only for the observed
heterogeneity but not for selection bias (Bairagi, Mishra and Durand-Morat,
2020; Läpple, Hennessy and Newman, 2013); (iii) difference-in-differences
(D-i-D) approaches require data to be collected for both the treatment and con-
trol groups before and after the employment of foreign workers, which would
lead to a significant loss of information given the unbalanced panel of Italian
farms used for this study (Vigani andKathage, 2019). The ESR falls into the IV
approach, estimating a selection equation based on a probability model (first
stage) and two continuous ULC equations, one for each treatment condition
(second stage) simultaneously (Fuglie and Bosch, 1995; Di Falco, Veronesi
and Yesuf, 2011; Magrini and Vigani, 2016).
The first stage is described by equation (5) and represents a probit selection
model distinguishing between farms employing and non-employing foreign
labour, where farmers choose whether to employ foreigners to minimize costs.
We assume that observations are independent of each other and that the choice
of employing immigrant workers is a function of exogenous variables Zi, such
as observable farmers’ and farms characteristics, and cost-related elements.
The latent variable A∗i captures the different level of ULC, and farms adopt
foreign labour (Ai = 1) only when such choice minimizes the ULC:
A∗i = Ziα+ ηi with Ai =
{
1 if A∗i > 0
0 otherwise , (5)
where ηi are iid error terms capturing unobservable factors, such as the expe-
rience in handling immigrant workers or the attitude towards foreigners. The
output of the first stage hence answers H1, revealing the farm’s and farmer’s
characteristics influencing the likelihood of employing immigrants. Moreover,
concerning CAP, results will give insights on which policy instruments foster
or hinder the choice of employing immigrant workers by farms.
In the second stage, we estimate the effect of employing immigrants on the
dairy farm-specific ULC (ymi) under the two regimesm, wherem= 1 indicates
employment of foreigners as the treatment, treated farms are those that actually employ them.
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the adoption of foreign labour and m= 2 indicates non-adoption:
Regime 1 : y1i = X1iβ1 + ε1i if Ai = 1 (5.1)
Regime 2 : y2i = X2iβ2 + ε2i if Ai = 0 (5.2)
Xmi is a vector of exogenous variables influencing the ULC, and εi are
iid error terms. If the error terms ηi in the selection equation (5), and εmi
in equations (5.1) and (5.2) are correlated, OLS estimates are inconsistent;
hence, correction is needed. Therefore, the inverse mills ratio evaluated at Ziα
is included in equations (5.1) and (5.2) to correct for selection bias (Maddala,
1983; Kleemann, Abdulai and Buss, 2014). Through this procedure, and fol-
lowing Heckman, Tobias and Vytlacil (2001), counterfactuals are developed
to test H2 through the estimation of the effect of adopting foreign workers
(the treatment) on the treated farms (TT) and the effect of the treatment on
the untreated farms (TU). Indeed, both TT and TU will provide insights on
whether and how the choice of (not)employing immigrant workers affects the
ULC, hence the farm’s competitiveness (see the Appendix for more details on
the ESR).
The full informationmaximum likelihood estimator ensures the highest effi-
ciency in estimating simultaneously the binary and continuous equations of
the ESR, deriving consistent standard errors and estimating the correlation
ρj between εj and η. A significant ρj indicates the presence of endogenous
switching, hence sample selectivity bias (Lokshin and Sajaia, 2004; Di Falco,
Veronesi and Yesuf, 2011; Läpple, Hennessy and Newman, 2013; Ma and
Abdulai, 2016; Amadu, McNamara and Miller, 2020).
Finally, for correct identification, vector Ziα in equation (5) must contain at
least one additional variable than those included in the vectorXkiβj in equations
(5.1) and (5.2). A valid selection instrument would affect the farm decision
of employing immigrants only, casting no effect on the ULC. This prevents
relying exclusively on the exclusion restrictions automatically generated by the
non-linearity of the selection model. Falsification tests are hence conducted to
establish the admissibility of these selection instruments (Di Falco, Veronesi
and Yesuf, 2011; Di Falco and Veronesi, 2013; Di Falco, 2014; Vigani and
Kathage, 2019).
4.1. Instrumental variable strategy
The ESR requires valid identification variable(s) correlated to the choice of
hiring immigrants and not to the outcome equations of ULC. According to
both sociology and labour economics studies, the so-called ‘network effect’
provides a significant source of information to prospective migrants (Massey
et al., 1993; Munshi, 2003; Bertoli andRuyssen, 2018). Therefore, immigrants
tend to cluster where higher shares of conational already exist (Moreno-Galbis
and Tritah, 2016), often looking for employment in the same occupation (Edin,
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networks as a screening for potential workers (Patel and Vella, 2013). Hoxhaj
(2015) recently found significant positive influence of networks on illegal
immigrants entering on the Italian territory. In light of these findings, we built
a first instrument (i.e. Networks) as the share of newly entered immigrants dur-
ing each year – with a valid permit – over the total immigrant population per
province. This allows to proxy the strength of the local immigrant network:
the stronger the ability of local networks to attract conational, the higher the
share of new entries with respect to the already-existing immigrant population.
Hence, farms located within provinces with strong attractiveness for foreign
migrants are expected to have higher likelihood of employing immigrants.
The study of Basile et al. (2021) recently concludes on the significant dis-
placement effect of immigrant entrants on the mobility of Italians, especially
those low skilled, confirming the findings of Mocetti and Porello (2010) at a
more disaggregated level. Such dynamics are explained as the ‘skating-rink’
model: when immigrants bear with the same skill set of domestic workers,
particularly low-skilled workers, there may exist more direct competition for
jobs. Therefore, foreign workers entering the local economy do not entail any
effect on both employment and wages: natives with similar skills usually move
out of the local labour markets. (Card and DiNardo, 2000). Therefore, we
introduced a second instrument (i.e. Native Out-Migration Rate) as the share
of Italian nationals exiting the province on the total Italian population at the
province level. Such a share wants to mimic the displacement effect of immi-
grants; hence, we expect that the higher the outflow of natives per province,
the more likely farms located in the area employ immigrants.
As argued by Mocetti and Porello (2010), powerful trade unions are tra-
ditional traits of the Italian economy, with centralised bargaining and strong
regulations of the labour market, restricting adjustments to labour shocks more
on the quantity rather than the wage side. In light of this, and adding to the
skating-ring model, both instruments10 do not influence the farm-specific ULC
but do have an effect on the decision to employ foreigners. Finally, the recent
comprehensive literature review of Edo (2019) on the impact of immigration
on developed economies in terms of wage and employment shed more light on
the issue. Indeed, the author concludes that, despite being controversial, the
overall impact of immigrants on the average native’s wage levels is negligible
or, at most, positive.
5. Data and econometric specifications
The data used for the analyses are retrieved from the Italian FarmAccountancy
Data Network (FADN)11, extracting the farm category ‘specialist milk’12 for
the period 2008–2018. This constitutes an unbalanced panel of 2,888 dairy
10 Both instruments were built relying on data provided by the Italian National Institute of Statistics
(ISTAT).
11 The authors are grateful to the CREA-PB of Rome (Italy) for providing the data.
12 This is as the European Commission defines those farms having ¾ of total grazing livestock as
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farms representatively distributed in all the Italian regions for a total of 10,138
observations.
Concerning the ESR, the selection equation (5) hinges on a binary variable,
taking the value 1 if the farm employs migrant workers and 0 otherwise, with
above 17 per cent of the sample adopting immigrant workforce (i.e. 503 dairy
farms).
The dependent variable of the outcome equations (5.1) and (5.2)
is the total labour cost per Euro of output, ULC, calculated as:
ULCit = [SalaryTaxesit+(hourlyOCit ∗ unpaid_hoursit)]/TotalOutput, where
Salary_Taxesit is the total farm’s expense in salaries and social security taxes
(i.e. including taxes paid on the family labour); hourlyOCit is the farm-specific
hourly opportunity costs for unpaid workers13; unpaid_hoursit is the total
amount of hours worked by family (unpaid) members and TotalOutput is the
(deflated) economic result of the farm at the end of the year. ULC hence mea-
sures the average cost of labour per unit of economic output, representing a
valid measure of competitiveness (OECD, 2019).
Covariates in equations (5), (5.1) and (5.2) are a set of farmer and farm char-
acteristics used in the literature related to the attitude towards and drivers of
adopting foreign labour and dairies’ cost structure. Among the farmers’ char-
acteristics, the farm holder’s age is expected to negatively affect the choice of
hiring foreigners as considered a proxy of conservatism (Semyonov, Raijman
and Gorodzeisky, 2006; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007; Weber, 2019), besides
being a pivotal factor for investment decisions and, consequently, for elab-
orating strategies that may ameliorate the farm cost-efficiency (e.g. Tauer
and Mishra (2006) find old farmers to be less cost efficient); male gender is
also a proxy for more conservatism, as females showed more positive atti-
tudes (O’Rourke and Sinnott, 2006; Vecchione et al., 2012). On the contrary,
the higher the educational level (‘None’, ‘Secondary School and Professional
School’, ‘High School’ and ‘University Degree’) the more supportive the indi-
vidual towards immigrants because of a lower level of ethnocentrism and
an optimistic view about their economic impacts (Coenders and Scheepers,
2003; Ivarsflaten, 2005; Hanson and Bell, 2007; Hainmueller and Hopkins,
2014). Finally, socioeconomically vulnerable individuals, such as the low-
income population, are more prone to negative attitudes towards immigrants
(Esses et al., 2001; Scheepers, Gijsberts and Coenders, 2002; Gorodzeisky
and Semyonov, 2016); thus, the level of off-farm income (‘0 to 2,000 Euro’,
‘2,001 to 10,400 Euro’, ‘10,401 to 15,600 Euro’ and ‘Over 15,600 Euro’) is
included, expecting that the higher the income, the more likely is the farm
to employ foreigners. Off-farm revenues may also prevent farms in difficult
economic conditions from leaving the market (Wieck and Heckelei, 2007).
Among the farms’ characteristics, we use both binary and continuous
numerical variables. The binary variables are the following: (i) 1 if the
farm is located in mountain areas (0 otherwise), a proxy for marginal or
13 This is a ready-to-use variable available from the Italian FADN that is assessed during the survey
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less-developed areas, associated with higher conservatism (Gorodzeisky and
Semyonov, 2016), unfavourable production conditions with higher expenses
for variable inputs and machinery (Wieck and Heckelei, 2007) and lacking
public services such as infrastructure (Limao and Venables, 2001); similarly,
one may expect farms located in lowlands to be more likely to hire immigrants,
especially because of the easier access to the farm for immigrants (i.e. 1 if the
farm is located in lowland areas and 0 otherwise); (ii) 1 if the farm is diversi-
fied14 (0 otherwise) as high diversification entails a larger volume of tasks to
be carried out, hence a potential higher demand of labour; (iii) 1 if the farm
falls in the category of large farms15 (0 otherwise), as farm size may influence
the number of hired workers, the cost structure due to diverse animal health
and disease management and more efficient use of assets (Dong et al., 2016;
Mosheim and Lovell, 2009); in a similar but opposite fashion, one may expect
small farms to be less likely to hire immigrant farmworkers (i.e. 1 if the farm
is categorised as ‘small’ and 0 otherwise).
Regarding continuous variables on farms’ characteristics, we include: (i)
the amount of grassland for their impact on the cost structure (Zimmermann
and Heckelei, 2012); (ii) the total value of machinery in the last decades
(Dong et al., 2016), which has reduced costs by increasing labour efficiency;
(iii) the absolute value of new investments as a proxy for technical innovation,
as new investments would face lower marginal costs ameliorating the farm’s
cost efficiency (Wieck and Heckelei, 2007), and farmers unwilling (or unable)
to invest in new technologies are more likely to have lower competitiveness
and of exiting the sector (Zimmermann and Heckelei, 2012); (iv) the intensity
of contract work per farm as the total expense in contract work and the share
of rented land over the total available land (UAA) because of their potential
effects on the labour cost structure (Eaton and Shepherd, 2001; Garrone et al.,
2019).
An important element affecting the farms’ decisions concerning input use
and allocation, especially labour, is the CAP support. Empirical evidence
shows heterogeneous effects within the CAP portfolio with respect to labour,
especially between Pillar I and Pillar II (Olper et al., 2014; Garrone et al.,
2019), coupled and decoupled payments (Petrick and Zier, 2011, 2012) and
environmental and investments measures (Pufahl and Weiss, 2009). Hence,
due to the potential mixed and measure-specific effects, we disaggregate CAP
payments received by dairy farms into five groups: (i) Coupled Direct Pay-
ments (CDP), coupled to the number of livestock or cropped land hectares; (ii)
Decoupled Direct Payments (DDP); (iii) Agri-environmental schemes (AES);
(iv) other annual payments from Rural Development Policy (RDP) – such as
Less Favoured Areas (LFA); (v) Other Rural Development subsidies, such
14 When diversified, the farm offers further services beyond the typical farming activity (e.g.
hospitality services, such as restaurant and/or accommodation).
15 According to the Italian FADN (personal communication), relying upon the economic dimension
of the farm, the latter is defined as Small (up to 24,999 Euro), Medium (from 25,000 to 99,999
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as investment aids (see Biagini, Antonioli and Severini (2020) for a more
thorough description of CAP implementation in Italy).
Finally, to exploit the panel nature of our dataset, we apply the Mund-
lak (1978) fixed effects (Wooldridge, 2010; Di Falco and Veronesi, 2013;
Vigani and Kathage, 2019), which account for farm-specific heterogeneity.16
This method consists of plugging the time-varying variables in their average
values over the 2008–2018 period, relying on the assumption that unobserv-
able characteristics are a linear function of the averages farm-variant variables
(Di Falco and Veronesi, 2013). Furthermore, to control for unobservable
region-specific factors, we introduce regional dummy variables. Table 1
illustrates the descriptive statistics concerning all the variables used in our
econometric strategy.
6. Results and discussion
Table 2 reports the difference between farms employing and non-employing
immigrants. Nearly 70 per cent of the sample’s total output is produced by
dairies that do employ immigrants, and that, on average, is 1.1 times larger
than non-employing (i.e. 113 per cent the percentage difference). Interestingly,
Table 2 also highlights the lower on-average total labour cost per unit of output
produced that immigrant-employing dairies benefit from, namely a reduction
of about one-third – 33 per cent.
The results of the ESR are displayed in Table 3.17 At the bottom of the
table, the estimated coefficients of the correlation terms (ρj;σi) indicate that
the absence of sample selection bias can be rejected and that in the sample there
is endogenous switching and heterogeneity. Moreover, there is a statistically
significant difference between the labour cost functions of farms adopting and
not adopting immigrants. Accordingly, the likelihood ratio test for joint inde-
pendence of the three equations is also significant, showing dependency and,
thus, selection bias (Asfaw et al., 2012; Kabunga, Dubois and Qaim, 2012).
Notably, ρ0 (i.e. the correlation coefficient between ηi and ε2,i) indicates pos-
itive selection bias; thus, farms not employing immigrants incur into higher
ULC levels than a random farm – that is, non-employing incurring into above-
average ULC are more likely to employ immigrants. On the other hand,
although positive, ρ1 is not significant, indicating that the null of absence of
sample selectivity bias for the ‘employing’ function may not be rejected. All in
all, the statistically significant ρ0 confirms that the ESR is appropriate (Lokshin
and Sajaia, 2004; Di Falco, Veronesi and Yesuf, 2011; Läpple, Hennessy and
Newman, 2013; Abdulai and Huffman, 2014; Mishra et al., 2018).
16 Methods based on random effects probit could address the issue of individual effects in
unbalanced panels with gaps (see Plum, 2014). However, applications in ESRmodels with simul-
taneous estimation of selection and outcome equations have not been developed yet. Further
research in this direction is still needed and could further the applications of ESR to panel data.
We are grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
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Table 2. Percentage differences of sociodemographic and economic indicators per farm
employing and non-employing immigrants, group averages, 2008–2018
Employing Non-Employing Difference
Total output 406,172.375 190,274.781 113%
ULC 0.360 0.540 −33%
New investments/total output 0.100 0.100 0%
Value of machinery/total output 0.340 0.400 −15%






Large farm 0.790 0.490 61%
Small farm 0.010 0.090 −89%
Lowland farm 0.390 0.290 34%
Mountain farm 0.380 0.460 −17%
Age of the farm holder 51.190 52.330 −2%
Presence of female holder 1.990 1.950 2%
Education level of the farm
holder
2.260 2.150 5%
Off-farm revenues 1.590 1.610 −1%
Share of rented land on total
land
0.540 0.470 15%
Contract work 126.680 41.210 207%
Grassland surface 43.650 15.530 181%
Diversified farm 1.150 1.090 6%
Productivity of total labour 37.600 29.256 29%
Hours worked total 7,956.362 4,828.836 65%
Hours worked by total paid 3,836.803 760.860 404%
Hours worked by unpaid 4,119.560 4,067.976 1%
Hours worked by paid
permanent
1,801.568 321.446 460%
Hours worked by paid seasonal 2,035.235 439.414 363%
Source: Authors’ elaboration.
The falsification tests suggest that the two identification variables rep-
resent a valid set of instruments.18 Both coefficients are positive and sig-
nificant as expected, suggesting the stronger the networks of immigrants
existing in a giving area, the higher the likelihood for immigrants to be
hired by local farms; and the higher the ratio of native who left the area,
the greater the probability of farms employing foreign workforce, since
areas experiencing high outflows of natives are probably featuring inflows of
immigrants.
18 The probit regression and the X2 test (26.00) reject the null hypothesis that the variable is equal
to 0 at 1 per cent; on the other hand, the OLS regression and the F -test (1.35) fails to reject the
null hypothesis that the set of identification variables is equal to 0. Results are reported in Table






/erae/advance-article/doi/10.1093/erae/jbab045/6395009 by guest on 26 O
ctober 2021
18 F. Antonioli et al.









immigrants (1/0) (Employing= 1) (Employing = 0)
Educational level 0.056** −0.011 −0.028**
(0.023) (0.009) (0.011)
Age of the holder 0.001 −0.002** 0.002*
(0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
Off-farm income −0.054 0.033** 0.023
(0.037) (0.014) (0.019)
Female holder 0.010 0.056 0.031
(0.084) (0.047) (0.030)
Diversified 0.240*** −0.061*** −0.095***
(0.043) (0.037) (0.026)
Investments 0.029 −0.050*** 0.005
(0.031) (0.018) (0.011)
Rented land (share) 0.035 −0.005 −0.042**
(0.034) (0.016) (0.016)
Mechanisation −0.345*** 0.107*** 0.259
(0.053) (0.023) (0.020)
Contract work 1.642 −0.076 −1.003*
(1.179) (0.705) (0.515)
Grassland 0.003*** −0.000*** −0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Large farm 0.722*** −0.138*** −0.403***
(0.036) (0.018) (0.015)
Small farm −1.510*** 0.182** 0.631***
(0.081) (0.079) (0.023)
Lowland farm 0.305*** −0.027* −0.158***
(0.037) (0.016) (0.019)
Mountain farm −0.150*** 0.009 0.048**
(0.050) (0.027) (0.020)
CDP −3.439*** 0.832** 2.085***
(0.797) (0.359) (0.443)
DDP −7.636*** −0.010 4.934***
(0.258) (0.189) (0.093)
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immigrants (1/0) (Employing= 1) (Employing = 0)













LR test of independent
equations
2311.43***
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. σi denotes the square-root of the variance of the error terms εji in the outcome
equations (5.1) and (5.2), respectively; ρj denotes the correlation coefficient between the error termηi of the selection
equation (5) and the error term εji of the outcome equations (5.1) and (5.2), respectively. Results are for variables in
level; see Table A3 in the Appendix for results of the Mundlak effect. *Significant at the 10 per cent level;
**Significant at the 5 per cent level;
***Significant at the 1 per cent level.
FE, Fixed Effect; LR, Likelihood Ratio.
Source: authors’ elaboration.
The first column of Table 3 reports the results for the selection equation (5),
explaining the drivers of employing immigrants in Italian dairy farms, test-
ing H1. Among farmers’ characteristics (i.e. farmers’ age, gender, off-farm
income and education), only education seems to play a role for the choice of
hiring foreigners, with the expected positive sign – the higher the education
attainment, the more likely the farms employ foreigners. The low predictive
power of the farmer’s characteristics links to the social environment – which
the present study cannot control for – that the literature proved already to be
a prominent influencer of farmers’ behaviour. Family members often exert a
significant role in the management of the farm, besides other referents that
may drive farmers’ decisions (Bechini et al., 2020; Sok et al., 2021), turning
individual characteristics not significant. Results hint that higher individual
educational attainment may reduce the influence of referents on individual
attitude towards foreigners.
Among the farms’ characteristics, results show that diversified farms are
more likely to employ immigrants, as this generally entails more agricul-
tural tasks to be undertaken, and of different nature, suggesting foreigners
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larger farms show a significant and positive effect on the probability of hiring
immigrants: for such farms, the demand for labour is higher because of higher
work intensity, surfaces and number of heads, and the limited domestic labour
offer steers the hiring of foreigners. The negative and significant coefficient of
small farms corroborate such results. Looking back at Table 2, large (small)
farms are more (less) concentrated into the ‘employing’ group, with 65 per
cent more the amount of hours worked on average and four times the amount
of hours worked by paid farmworkers; moreover, the employing group has
twice the average total output, with higher labour productivity – calculated
as the total output per hour worked – as well as near-double grassland sur-
faces. Generally, larger farms may better cope with the additional cost related
to hire immigrants, finding it easier to employ them. Similarly, farms located
in mountainous areas are less likely to hire immigrants, while the opposite is
true for those farms located in lowlands. Regarding the former, the lack of
services such as public transport and the significant distances from the immi-
grant networks – where immigrants usually reside – disincentive the hiring of
foreigners; on the contrary, farms located near urban centres, often in lowland
areas, are more likely to employ immigrant farmworkers, also because of the
easier accessibility of foreigners to the workplace.
Mechanisation intensity elicits significant negative effect, as expected:
highly-mechanised farms seem to prefer native farmworkers. Immigrants may
lack of skills’ signals and deemed as low-skilled workers (Basile et al., 2021).
Neither the volume of investments, the share of rented land, nor the intensity of
contract work show significant effect on the likelihood of employing migrants.
Finally, when farms rely on large grassland areas, they are more prone to
employ immigrants; this may relate to the fact that the presence of grasslands
mean cows need to be handled to such grazing areas to feed – grasslands have
not to be contiguous to the farm where stables are.
Among the different CAP payments, none resemble a pulling factor for
the employment of migrants as all significant effects are of negative nature.
Although naïve, the first logical explanation relates to the fact that as far as
immigrants provide with lower ULC, the smaller the amount of public subsidy
the farms receive, the higher the likelihood to hire farmworkers that lighten the
cost structure. CAP CDP are coupled to specific productions (e.g. soy hectares
and number of bovine heads) and types of animal (e.g. suckler cow). Therefore,
although farms in the dataset are specialised in milk production, they may
still receive subsidies coupled to field crops or for suckler cows, activities that
are less labour-intensive, offering an explanation for the negative coefficient.
Likewise, higher CAP DDP reduces the probability of hiring foreigners in line
with Petrick and Zier (2012, 2011): DDP allows for releasing labour as such
subsidies are distributed independently from the output produced. Therefore,
this may negatively affect the dairy-specific demand for labour, either national
or foreign. However, the works of Garrone et al. (2019) and Olper et al. (2014)
find a positive effect of DDP in reducing farm labour losses. This may suggest
that dairies receiving DDP have no incentives to hire additional labour and can
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Table 4. Average expected ULC levels and treatment effects
Decision stage Treatment effects

















Note: Standard deviation and standard errors in squared and rounded parentheses, respectively. Two-sample t-test
with unequal variances and unpaired sample is applied to test for significance.
***Significant at the 1 per cent level.
Source: Authors’ elaboration.
Several authors (Olper et al., 2014; Pufahl and Weiss, 2009; Garrone et al.,
2019) show that environmental practices to which AES payments are destined
positively affect work creation in the farming sector mainly because they are
labour intensive. Nevertheless, the negative coefficient seems to support the
strand of literature (Chabé-Ferret and Subervie, 2013; Uthes and Matzdorf,
2013; Bertoni et al., 2020) warning of their windfall effects – that is, paying
for practices that would have been adopted anyway, decreasing their efficiency
with no enhancement of the labour demand. Others annual RDP payments
(e.g. LFA) as well as other RDP measures (e.g. support to farm investments)
are not significant. The literature, in this regard, offers controversial results.
Garrone et al., (2019) and Petrick and Zier (2012, 2011) find no significant
effect for LFA payments on old MS’ agricultural employment, while Olper
et al.’s (2014) result for RDP support show to be quite sensitive to model
specifications, with investment aids boosting labour losses and Petrick and
Zier (2012) concluding on the positive impact of investment-aid subsidies on
agricultural jobs maintenance.
The quantification of the impact of immigrant workers on total labour costs
is reported in the counterfactual analysis in Table 4. Values (a) and (b) indi-
cate the average labour cost observed in our sample across farms that actually
hire and do not hire migrants, respectively, whereas (c) and (d) represent their
counterfactuals. Both the Treatment on the treated (TT) and Treatment on the
untreated (TU) effects are calculated as described in the Appendix.
Looking at the TT, the high and positive differentials between the decisions
of hiring (a) and non-hiring (c) foreign workers suggest that in the hypotheti-
cal scenario in which employing farmers decided to not to do so, their relative
labour cost per Euro of output would turn negative – a situation in which
either the total labour cost or the total farm output is negative, with the lat-
ter representing the only possible outcome, for example, due to high ratios of
auto-consumption or a negative variation of farms’ stocks. Therefore, if dairies
adopting immigrant workforce would employ Italian farm workers instead,
they would be forced to operate a profound restructuring of the production
process to accommodate potential losses and to avoid exiting the sector. On
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for reducing labour costs (H2), the effect of the TU shows that the average
labour cost of non-employing would decrease more than 45 per cent (i.e. a
reduction of about 0.34) if they would decide to adopt foreign labour.
Hence, we can accept H2, as foreign farmworkers allow reducing Italian
dairy farms’ labour costs. In this regard, foreign workforce seems to represent
a non-replaceable factor of production, maintaining farms’ competitiveness
and preventing their exit from the market.
Results clearly point to a non-perfect substitution between native and immi-
grant farmworkers in terms of ULC for the considered Italian case study. This
opens the floor to four scenarios explaining how the migrant farmworkers rep-
resent a more competitive production factor for Italian dairy farms: (i) foreign
labour has lower unitary cost than national labour, ceteris paribus. In this
scenario, one may wonder whether immigrants are sufficiently rewarded for
their professional profile, that is, whether they receive a non-specialised wage
despite carrying out highly specialised tasks (e.g. milker); (ii) data are affected
by underreporting of working time, with significant shares of the salaries paid
‘under-the-table’, unlawfully, and preventing the farmworker to gain access
to welfare programmes and grants; (iii) a mix of the two scenarios described
above; lastly, (iv) immigrants are more productive farmworkers than nation-
als, capable of producing more output at the same cost as recently found by
Baldoni, Coderoni and Esposti (2021) for the Italian agricultural sector.
7. Conclusions and policy implications
The research addresses a new trait of the organisation of labour markets in the
EU agriculture, namely the growing importance of immigrant workforce and
farm competitiveness.
Overall, immigrants exert a generally positive impact on farm competitive-
ness and they can represent a solution for the structural shortages of labour
in the farm sector. Foreign-born workers are ‘essential’ resources as formally
recognised by the European Commission during the COVID-19 emergency
(European Commission, 2020) and largely documented by the media: har-
vests of fruits and vegetable in Italy, Spain, Germany and the UK have been
compromised by the lack of the migrant seasonal workers (The Economist,
2020a, 2020b). Furthermore, the Stockholm Programme of 2009 recognizes
that ‘[…] in the context of the important demographic challenges that will face
the Union in the future with an increased demand for labour […] immigration
can contribute to increased competitiveness and economic vitality’, encourag-
ing ‘[…] the creation of flexible admission systems [that] enable migrants to
take full advantage of their skills and competence’.
The importance of foreign labour for the EU agriculture is already trigger-
ing EU social initiatives, particularly the new-born European Labour Authority
(ELA) under the new European Pillar of Social Rights (EPSR), the Farm
to Fork Strategy and the recently agreed CAP reform. Notably, the latter
envisages to ‘[…] promote employment, growth, social inclusion and local
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implementation of EU rules on labour mobility, and ensuring that fair social
security rules are enforced and coordinated throughout the Single Market’
(Schuh et al., 2019); and the Farm to Fork, particularly after the COVID-
19 pandemic, recognizes the importance of EPSR principles ‘[…] especially
when it comes to precarious, seasonal and undeclared workers. The consider-
ations of workers’ social protection, working and housing conditions as well
as protection of health and safety will play a major role in building fair, strong
and sustainable food systems’.
Despite the relevance of the topic, empirical evidences investigating the role
of immigrant workers on farm competitiveness are scant. We address this issue
using the theory developed by Malchow-Møller et al., (2013) and focusing on
the case study of Italian dairy farms. We first explore the factors explaining
the probability of hiring foreigner workers. Education as well as farm size
and location are important drivers. Results emphasise the important role of
CAP payments, with an overall negative effect on the probability of employing
immigrants, especially concerning coupled, decoupled and agri-environmental
instruments. Results of the counterfactual analysis show that, on average,
farms’ employing immigrants benefit from lower ULC, thus fostering their
competitiveness.
The scenarios we described for explaining the positive role of immigrants
employed in the farming sector need policy interventions. If foreign work-
ers are more productive than nationals, a healthy and well-functioning labour
market should reward such productivity with salary levels at least equal to
those of Italians as declared in the above-mentioned Stockholm Programme:
‘The Union must ensure fair treatment of third country nationals who reside
legally on the territory of its Member States […] granting them rights and
obligations comparable to those of citizens of the Union’. On the contrary,
if under-reporting, black labour markets and unfair salaries are the reasons
explaining lower costs, indicating severe exploitation issues needing urgent
policy interventions to cut off unlawful behaviour.
This issue is at the heart of the inclusion of the social conditionality within
the CAP 2023–2027. Indeed, it explicitly communicates the societal demand
for policy interventions aimed at the lawful and smooth integration of immi-
grants into the agricultural sector, demanding stricter controls to tackle unfair
treatments, enhancing the competitiveness of the farming sector at no detri-
ment of basic social and work rights. This will cover diverse areas, from
working time to housing, for all agricultural workers, thus including immigrant
labourers. Besides ethical reasons, it aims at preventing unfair competition by
granting more resources to lawful farmers respecting workers’ rights. There-
fore, conditionality on workers’ conditions may ensure that EU taxpayers –
funding the CAP – contribute to improving working and living conditions,
avoiding, or at least reducing, welfare losses for the entire society.
Finally, limitations of the research hopefully ignite further research efforts
in this field of study. Future research efforts should focus on the policy trade-
off between societal gains and farm losses: raising immigrants’ wages may
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improving the market position of those suffering from unfair competition.19 As
suggested by an anonymous referee, it is crucial to deepen the understanding
on the dynamic perspective of immigrant employment, exploiting the panel
nature of the data. Whether farm’s wage levels actually shifted after employ-
ing immigrants could be unveiled via dynamic models, accounting for both
endogeneity and autocorrelation. Furthermore, both the geographical and sec-
torial coverages should be expanded for cementing the results presented. The
current study does not discern among farms in which the immigrant working
hours may widely vary. Therefore, whether and how the farms’ cost struc-
ture change according to the amount of hours actually worked by immigrant
employees may be empirically investigate by future research. Similarly, differ-
entiating the analysis by farm size may deliver additional insights on the role
of immigrant labour on farm competitiveness. Moreover, further characteris-
tics, such as the specific tasks performed by the farmworker and the country
of origin, besides other personal elements as the educational attainment, age
and agriculture-related skills and experience, may deepen the understanding of
their role on the farm performance, providing further insights for the political
debate and policy design.
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Appendix: The endogenous switching regression model:
further statistical details
Referring to equations (5), (5.1) and (5.2), ηi and εmi are assumed to have a trivariate normal




σ2ε1 . σε1η. σ2ε2 σε2η
. . σ2η
 ,
where σ2η is the variance of ηi in equation (5), assumed to be equal to 1 since the coefficients
are estimable only up to a scale factor (Abdulai and Huffman, 2014; Di Falco, Veronesi and
Yesuf, 2011; Mishra et al., 2017); σ2ε1 and σ
2
ε2 are the variances of ε1i,ε2i in equations
(5.1) and (5.2), respectively; σε1η and σε2η are the covariances between ηi and εmi. Since
y1i and y2i are not observed simultaneously, the covariance between ε1i, ε2i is not defined
(corresponding to the dots in Ψ) (Di Falco, 2014). Because of the correlation between ηi
and εmi, the expected values of ε1i and ε2i conditional on the sample-selection are non-zero:








where σε1η and σε2η are the covariances between ηi and εmi, ∅(.) is a standard normal




and λ2i =− ∅(Ziα)1−Φ(Ziα) are the inverse mills ratios evaluated at Ziα and included
in equations (5.1) and (5.2) to correct for selection bias (Maddala, 1983; Kleemann, Abdulai
and Buss, 2014). The estimated covariances σε1η and σε2η , if statistically significant, sug-
gest that the decision to hire migrants and the total labour cost are correlated, confirming the
evidence of endogenous-switching and rejecting the null of absence of sample selectivity
bias (Di Falco, Veronesi and Yesuf, 2011).
The application of the ESR allows to compare the expected ULC of farms that hire
migrants (a) to those that do not hire migrants (b), besides investigating the expected ULC
of hypothetical counterfactual cases, that is, farms employing migrants as they would not
hire any foreign workers (c), and those not employing immigrants as they would do (d):
a. Adopters of migrant labour deciding to adopt (hire) migrants (real):
E(y1i|Ai = 1) = X1iβ1 +σε1ηλ1i
b. Non-adopters of migrant labour deciding to not adopt (hire) migrants (real):
E(y2i|Ai = 0) = X2iβ2 +σε2ηλ2i
c. Adopters of migrant labour deciding not to adopt (hire) migrants (hypothetical):
E(y2i|Ai = 1) = X1iβ2 +σε2ηλ1i
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E(y1i|Ai = 0) = X2iβ1 +σε1ηλ2i.
According to Heckman, Tobias and Vytlacil (2001), we compare the effect of the treat-
ment ‘employing migrants’ on the treated farms (TT) by calculating the difference between
(a) and (c), representing the effect of hiring immigrants on the TLC of farmers who hire
migrants:
TT : E(y1i|Ai = 1)−E(y2i|Ai = 1) = X1i (β1 −β2)+λ1i (σε1η −σε2η) . (A1)
In the same fashion, we calculate the effect of the treatment on the untreated farms (TU),
that is, those farms that do not employ any foreign workers, as the difference between (d)
and (b), describing the effect of hiring immigrants on the TLC of those farmers who do not
employ immigrants:
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Table A2. Shares of immigrant farmworkers by number of people and working hours per
main agricultural sector on the total amount of immigrants, 2018
2018
Share immigrant workers
(on the total of immigrant)
Share immigrant work-











Source: Authors’ elaboration on the Italian FADN.









(1/0) (Employing= 1) (Employing = 0)
































































**Significant at the 5 per cent level;
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Table A4. Probit and OLS regressions and IV falsification test
Probit OLS
Immigrants (1/0) ULC
Educational level 0.114*** −0.0232***
(0.033) (0.006)
Age of the holder 0.00475 −0.00119
(0.004) (0.000)






















Large farm 1.012*** −0.275***
(0.054) (0.007)
Small farm −1.300*** 0.492***
(0.173) (0.012)
Lowland farm 0.395*** −0.0795***
(0.058) (0.009)
Mountain farm −0.356*** 9.78E-05
(0.078) (0.010)






Native Out-Migration Rate 34.16*** 0.318
(9.67) (1.592)
Age of the holder (mean) −0.00296 0.00361***
(0.005) (0.000)
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Off-farm income (mean) 0.183*** 0.0217**
(0.063) (0.010)
Investments (mean) 0.0785 −0.0497***
(0.105) (0.013)
CDP (mean) 6.848*** 0.0823
(1.75) (0.366)
DDP (mean) −2.955*** 1.704***
(0.757) (0.089)
AES (mean) −0.933 0.536***
(0.899) (0.117)
RDPA (mean) 0.423 1.257***
(0.676) (0.098)
RDPO (mean) 0.0797 −0.0327
(0.47) (0.048)




Region dummies Yes Yes
R²= 0.54
Falsification test
Networks= 0 X2 (2) = 26.00 F(2, 10,060)= 1.35
Native Out-Migration Rate= 0 Prob= 0.0000 Prob= 0.2592
*Significant at the 10 per cent level;
**Significant at the 5 per cent level;
***Significant at the 1 per cent level;
RDPA, Rural Development Program annual;
RDPO, Rural Development Program others.
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